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Abstract
Petschonek, Sarah Lynn. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2011. Developing
the Just Culture Assessment Tool: A Method for Measuring Individual Cultural
Perceptions in a Healthcare Setting. Major Professor: Ronald S. Landis.

The purpose of the current study was to develop a method for measuring just
culture in a hospital work environment. A just culture refers to a work environment
characterized by an emphasis on providing fair and just treatment to healthcare
professionals involved in adverse medical events. The concept of just culture has recently
emerged as a popular topic in the healthcare literature and is touted as a panacea for what
is ailing the field of healthcare. The presence of a just culture is said to be accompanied
by a wide range of positive benefits related to patient safety including an increase in error
reporting and a decrease in medical error; however, currently no evidence exists in
support of this claim. This absence of data is largely due to the fact that there is no widely
used method for measuring the level to which a just culture exists in a work environment.
Without this critical tool, the extent to which a just culture exists is only speculation and
without a way to assess just culture, its purported benefits remain speculation as well.
Empirical and theoretical methods were used to develop the Just Culture Assessment
Tool (JCAT). The JCAT consisted of 27 items which were categorized into six
dimensions: balancing a blame-free approach with accountability, feedback and
communication, openness of communication, quality of the event reporting process,
continuous improvement, and trust. The methods and the results of the current study have
theoretical and practical implications, contributing not only to the traditional
organizational and psychological literature, but also research in the healthcare field.
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Developing the Just Culture Assessment Tool: A Method for Measuring Individual
Cultural Perceptions in a Healthcare Setting
Introduction
The quality of the healthcare system affects every person in the United States.
Everyone relies on it to provide care, but today alone, at least 2,000 people will be
injured and more than 120 people in the U.S. will die from preventable medical error
(Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). The ability to prevent these mistakes hinges upon
a willingness to discuss and learn from medical errors and adverse events. Error reporting
is key to reducing error: it is believed that an increase in error reporting will decrease the
number of adverse events in healthcare facilities (Chassin, Loeb, Schmalz, & Wachter,
2010; Kohn et al., 1999; Marx, 2001; Weiner, Hobgood, & Lewis, 2008).
Although many researchers have acknowledged the benefits of error reporting over
the last ten years, the process of error reporting is viewed as a failing healthcare
innovation (Nembhard, Alexander, Hoff, & Ramanujam, 2009). The practical and
theoretical challenges associated with error reporting are abundant. Authors argue the
pros and cons of mandatory versus voluntary error reporting: some advocate for
mandatory event reporting as the solution to collecting information about errors (Kohn et
al., 1999), yet this approach has several inherent problems. Despite the fact that scholars
agree on the value of error reporting, under reporting is rampant, even in environments
where reporting is mandated (Barach & Small, 2000; Nembhard et al., 2009; Wood &
Nash, 2005). Leape (1997) estimates that only 2-3% of errors are reported and Marx
argues “…many healthcare workers will only report that which they cannot conceal” (p.
4, 2001). This phenomenon presents a problem: how can a behavior be mandated,
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without knowing when the behavior occurs? Despite the implications of the term
“mandatory reporting”, these systems depend upon each individual’s willingness to
discuss error. Therefore, all error reporting is voluntary to some degree and the challenge
is to determine what factors are associated with voluntary reporting (Barach & Small,
2000; Weiner et al., 2008).
Although it is common to blame the individual, it is unrealistic to expect that
individuals will never make mistakes (Marx, 2001; Reason, 2000). Reason writes, “We
cannot change the human condition, but we can change the conditions under which
humans work” (p. 769). Therefore, if we accept that humans will make mistakes
regardless of their intent or competency, then the focus should shift to a study of the work
environment and an exploration of those organizational factors that affect behavior.
Reason concludes that for individuals in crucial safety positions, “organisational culture
takes on a profound significance” (p. 770).
The concept of organizational culture has been a prominent fixture in the
organizational sciences and encompasses multiple types of culture related to specific
aspects of the organization’s activities. In the context of healthcare settings,
organizational safety culture sits at the forefront of the discussion. Safety culture has been
tied to a range of positive outcomes such as increased safety compliance and participation
(Clarke, 2006) and a reduction in errors and injuries (Hofmann & Mark, 2006).
To compliment an overarching safety culture, the healthcare field has developed a
specific framework for managing safety issues. After a long-standing tradition of using a
blame-based culture, there has been a surge of interest in a new approach called just
culture (Marx, 2001; Rosen et al., 2010; Vogelsmeier, Scott-Cawiezell, Miller, & Griffin,
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2010), which Reason (2000) loosely defines as “a collective understanding of where the
line should be drawn between blameless and blameworthy actions” (p.769). Just culture
first appeared in the aviation safety literature and has been gaining ground in other “high
hazard” industries like the field of healthcare (Gaba, 2000). Numerous publications tout
the benefits associated with just culture, such as increased reporting and decreased
medical error (Leape, Berwick, & Bates, 2002; Marx, 2001; Wachter & Pronovost,
2009); however, despite its popularity, this concept is still new to the academic literature,
lacking a method of measurement and an agreed upon definition. Of central importance
for the current study, it is necessary to develop a reliable and valid tool that can be used
to measure just culture. The lack of such a measure prohibits substantial advancements of
the just culture concept in the scientific literature.
With the preceding issues in mind, the purpose of the current study was to
develop a measure that can be used to assess individual perceptions of just culture in a
healthcare setting. Developing a just culture measure began with a review of the relevant
literature to permit an adequate conceptualization of the key construct. In addition to
considering literature specifically related to just culture, related concepts were also
reviewed in the service of identifying important similarities and differences between just
culture and existing concepts and measures. The following literature review develops a
foundation for defining the concept of just culture.
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Literature Review
Organizational Culture
Scholars agree that individuals locate themselves in their organization’s culture
before acting (Glick, 1985; Guldenmund, 2000), which may explain why culture has
received a prominent place in the literature. Schein (1990) authored a widely used
definition of organizational culture: “culture can now be defined as a pattern of basic
assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, as it learns to cope
with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and, therefore is to be taught to new members as the
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 111). Schein
(2004) argues for three aspects of culture, in which culture consists of basic underlying
assumptions, espoused values, and artifacts. In this model, the underlying assumptions
consist of values and norms, which are represented as goals or strategies. These goals are
then manifested as observable evidence of the organization’s culture such as dress codes,
physical workspace layouts and communication patterns, which are referred to as artifacts
(Schein, 2004). This model proposes that informally held norms and values are related to
individual behaviors.
Guldenmund (2000) represents these concepts in terms of three layers: an outer
layer, a middle layer, and a core. The outer layer is synonymous with Schein’s (2004)
concept of artifacts, which are observable, but difficult to interpret in isolation. The
middle layer consists of the attitudes and policies that are a more formal expression of the
culture. Finally, the core represents the true underlying culture of the organization. This
set of core beliefs and assumptions can influence individual behavior and is a powerful
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phenomenon for impacting workplace interaction. The goal of culture studies is to
understand this core; however, the core is implicit and intangible, so it must be
deciphered through the study of artifacts and espoused values.
An on-going point of debate in the organizational and psychological literature is
the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate. At least three
different schools of thought contribute to the discussion. The culture vs. climate issue can
be argued in terms of implicit vs. explicit levels (Denison, 1996; Guldenmund, 2000;
Hale, 2000; Schein, 2004), differences in methodological approaches (Denison, 1996;
Payne, 2000) and differences in stability over time Denison (1996).
Because the concept of espoused beliefs has been equated with a measure of
explicit individual attitudes and perceptions, it has been suggested that climate is
synonymous with Schein’s concept of espoused beliefs, whereas culture would be aligned
with the basic underlying assumptions (Denison, 1996; Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000;
Schein, 2004). Based on this understanding, climate is measured in terms of attitudes and
can therefore be assessed directly. In this sense, culture cannot be directly measured;
therefore, researchers must find methods for measuring culture, which could be estimated
through the process of studying espoused beliefs. As Payne (2000) explains, “…although
it is difficult to distinguish definitions of culture from those of climate, it is possible to
claim that climate is a way of measuring culture” (p. 166). To rephrase, studying the
attitudes associated with climate will aid in the understanding of the more elusive
underlying core values of culture (Payne, 2000).
Studies of culture and climate also display differences with respect to
measurement methodology. Generally, qualitative methods are used to evaluate culture in
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an attempt to explore the hidden core values, while quantitative methods are employed to
assess attitudes and perceptions (Denison, 1996; Payne, 2000). However, over time these
lines have blurred so that both culture and climate are measured through a variety of
methodological approaches (Denison, 1996; Payne, 2000).
In addition, Denison (1996) also notes that the difference between culture and
climate is related to stability: culture is extremely stable over time, while climate is more
malleable over shorter periods of time. Although this idea makes sense conceptually,
there are no clear rules with regard to what constitutes short versus long-term change.
Taken together, these points suggest that the line between culture and climate is blurred
and that these areas converge.
Although the aforementioned authors have written of the differences between
climate and culture, these same authors also acknowledge the strong degree of similarity
and overlap between the two areas. They conclude the differences may be more
perceptual than real (Denison, 1996; Payne, 2000), and that culture and climate offer
“different but overlapping interpretations of the same phenomenon” (Ashkanasy,
Wilderom, & Peterson, 2000, p. 7). Terminology differences aside, the common ground
across culture and climate studies is the idea that various aspects of the work environment
inform individual attitudes and these attitudes are associated with behavioral outcomes
(Denison, 1996; Guldenmund, 2000; Reason, 2000; Schein, 2004). For the purposes of
the current discussion, the term safety culture will be used to broadly encompass the
general concepts associated with safety culture and climate.
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Relationship between Safety Culture and Safety Outcomes
A specific subset of culture, known as safety culture, focuses on how employees
perceive the level of safety in their work environment. Safety culture is defined as “those
aspects of the organisational culture which will impact on attitudes and behaviour related
to increasing or decreasing risk” (Guldenmund, 2000, p. 251.). Overall, culture of safety
at the organizational level provides the context for understanding individual level
perceptions of safety culture and their relationship to safety participation behaviors
(Clarke, 2006; Guldenmund, 2000). Work environments with strong safety cultures have
been tied to a range of safety-related outcomes. The majority of the safety outcome
research has been conducted in manufacturing and industrial settings (Clarke, 2006), in
which a strong safety culture is associated with lower rates of injuries and microaccidents
(Clarke, 2006; Zohar, 2000) and higher indicators of safety performance (Clarke, 2006;
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996).
The field of healthcare has seen a recent surge of interest in safety culture and its
relationship to patient safety. Specific to the field of healthcare, it has been stated that
error reporting is closely related to individuals’ perceptions of their hospital’s safety
culture (Wood & Nash 2005). In addition, a strong safety culture has been linked to fewer
instances of medication errors, injuries, other adverse events (Hofmann & Mark, 2006;
Mardon, Khanna, Sorra, Dyer, & Famolaro, 2010), and even to patient mortality (Huang
et al., 2010). When viewing safety culture in terms of healthcare and other organizations,
the core concept is that a strong safety culture is associated with an increase in
individuals’ safety behaviors.
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A strong organizational safety culture is associated with higher levels of safety
compliance and participation (Clarke, 2006; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). Safety
compliance is defined as “adhering to safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe
manner”, whereas safety participation “involves helping coworkers, promoting the safety
program within the workplace, demonstrating initiative, and putting effort into improving
safety in the workplace” (Neal et al., 2000, p. 101). Safety compliance is characterized by
following existing rules with a base level of effort and these behaviors are mandated by
the organization. Alternatively, safety participation is more proactive, whereby
individuals voluntarily take extra steps beyond the required behaviors in order to
contribute to an environment of safety (Neal et al., 2000). When assigning the practice of
error reporting to the category of either safety compliance or safety participation, it is
important to consider the characteristics of error reporting behaviors. Error reporting is
said to be voluntary (Barach & Small, 2000; Weiner et al., 2008) and is a proactive
attempt to improve safety in the organization (Barach & Small, 2000). Based on these
voluntary and proactive characteristics, error reporting behaviors would best fit into the
safety participation category. Figure 1, taken from Neal et al. (2000), depicts a direct
relationship between safety climate and safety participation. In the context of error
reporting, the model in Figure 1 suggests that perceptions of a safe work environment are
related to error reporting behaviors (Neal et al., 2000). It should be noted that the authors
use the term “climate” rather than culture in their model; however, Neal et al. (2000) base
much of their logic on the work by Reason (1990), who primarily discusses the study of
the environment in terms of culture. Therefore, despite the difference in terminology,
their findings are relevant to the current discussion of safety culture.
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Figure 1. Neal et al. (2000) model of safety performance.

Culture Issues
When studying culture and behavior, researchers are faced with multilevel
measurement considerations. In trying to link organizational culture to individual
behavior, researchers often commit a fallacy at the wrong level: comparing an
organizational-level variable to an individual-level outcome variable. This distinction can
be problematic for researchers who are attempting to study the effect of the
organizational culture on individual behavior. (For a more extensive discussion on this
topic see Glick, 1985).
At the core of the culture issue is the idea that individuals share the same
perception of their environment (Glick, 1985; Payne, 2000; Reichers & Schneider, 1990).
In theory, a cohesive measurable culture can only exist if the individuals operating within
that culture perceive it the same way. This assertion is problematic because everyone
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perceives their organization differently (Hershberger, Lichtenstein, & Knox, 1994) and
these individual perceptions are meaningful (James, Hater, Gent, & Bruni, 1978). Taking
these individual perceptions into account can enhance the study of organizational culture,
but the approach to studying culture should be considered in the context of the
researcher’s goals. Each researcher is tasked with deciding whether to treat culture as a
cohesive, organizational-level variable or as a collection of individual perceptions of the
environment.
Psychological Climate
For those researchers interested in studying the individual perceptions of culture
and its impact on the individual, it is important to introduce the concept of psychological
climate. The current study does not focus on tying individual-level perceptions to
individual outcomes; therefore, the discussion will be a brief overview (for a more
detailed review see James et al., 1978).
Just as the organization is the level of analysis for culture research, the individual
is the level of measurement and analysis for psychological climate research.
Psychological climate is “the individual’s cognitive representations of relatively proximal
situational conditions, expressed in terms that reflect psychologically meaningful
interpretations of the situation” (James et al., 1978, p. 786). Theorists believe that
perceptual differences may exist among individuals in the same situation, but also that
these perceptual differences are psychologically too important to be regarded as error
variance (James et al., 1978). James et al. explain that these differences are significant:
“If individuals assign unique meanings to situations and formulate attitudes and decide
upon behaviors based on these unique meanings, then it is the unique meanings, and not
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the objective situation per se, that should provide the maximum predictions of attitudes
and behavior” (p. 786). Taken together, the psychological climate research suggests that
individual perceptions of the work environment are associated with various types of job
performance (Glick, 1985; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2010; Parker et al., 2003).
The psychological climate perspective should be considered more thoroughly for studies
seeking to link perceptions of just culture to individual behavioral outcomes.
Just Culture
Just culture has recently become a pervasive topic in the healthcare literature and
has received high praise from the healthcare community: the just culture approach is
believed to increase error reporting, decrease the instance of medical errors, and
ultimately improve patient safety (Beyea, 2004; Connor et al., 2007; Dekker, 2009;
Frankel, Leonard, & Denham, 2006; Leape et al., 2002; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Marx,
2001; Reason, 2001; Wachter & Pronovost, 2009). Given the high rate of medical errors
and the increased scrutiny surrounding patient safety, hospitals across the country are
trying to implement the just culture approach in an attempt to reap the benefits associated
with it (Beyea, 2004).
Just culture is making headway in practice and in popular literature, yet it lacks a
concise, widely accepted definition and a method of measurement. Therefore, defining
and measuring just culture are necessary first steps on the path to exploring and
developing just culture conceptually and in practice.
It should be noted that although the just culture concept has become a popular
discussion point in the healthcare literature, it has yet to receive equal attention in the
traditional organizational and psychological literature; therefore, the current discussion
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will draw from both popular and academic literature sources in the interest of developing
a well-rounded definition and conceptual basis for the just culture concept.
Defining just culture. Despite the popularity of the just culture concept, few have
ventured to provide a formal definition; therefore, the current discussion will provide a
brief overview of the just culture concept, followed by a more detailed discussion of the
primary components associated with just culture, and closing with a formal definition of
just culture.
A just culture describes a work environment in which individuals believe they
will receive fair and just treatment when involved in an adverse event (Connor et al.,
2007; Frankel et al., 2006; Marx, 2001; Sammer et al., 2010). The key to providing a fair
outcome is the extensive follow-up and evaluation process that accompanies an adverse
event. The goal of this process is to determine whether an adverse event occurs as a result
of a system error, which requires a multi-level failure across the organization, or if the
event is occurred solely because of the actions of an individual (Reason, 1997).
Proponents of just culture believe that individuals should not be blamed for adverse
events that occur due to system error because these events are beyond the control of any
one person (Marx, 2001; Reason, 1997). As Reason (2000) explains, just culture is “a
collective understanding of where the line should be drawn between blameless and
blameworthy actions” (p.769). This balance between individual responsibility and
system-level responsibility is at the core of a just culture. Using this framework,
individual involvement in system-level events would receive a non-punitive treatment. If
a follow-up process determines an individual was solely responsible for the event, this
scenario would warrant a higher level of accountability for that individual.
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For this balanced approach to be effective, it is important to have bi-directional
communication about the process: staff members must be willing to openly communicate
about events (Connor et al., 2007; Frankel et al., 2006; Marx, 2001; Sammer, Lykens,
Singh, Mains, & Lackhan, 2010) and the hospital leaders must be willing to provide
feedback and updates about how that information is being used to improve patient safety
(Connor et al., 2007; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). With these concepts in mind, just
culture can be examined in terms of several characteristic dimensions.
Dimensions of just culture. As the following sections illustrate, just culture is
characterized by several tenets: balance (composed of both non-punitive treatment for
system-level events as well as accountability for individual-level events), openness of
communication, trust, an overall goal of continuous improvement, feedback and
communication about events, and the quality of the event reporting process.
Balance. At the core of this definition is the focus on what happens to individuals
after they are involved in medical errors and adverse events – whether these come to
fruition or are caught ahead of time as near misses. Weiner et al. (2008) explain the just
culture approach is meant to provide a balanced framework for managing an individual
after the unsafe act:
A just culture, then, is one in which the beliefs, assumptions, and expectations
that govern behavior in an organization conform to generally held principles of
moral conduct…Although the term ‘just culture’ can be construed broadly, the
term is often more narrowly used to refer to the beliefs, assumptions, and
expectations that govern accountability and discipline for unsafe acts (e.g., near
misses, medical errors, and adverse events). (p. 404)
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Although multiple tenets define just culture, this approach is ultimately focused
on striking a balance between two other types of healthcare culture: punitive culture and
non-punitive culture.
Punitive approach versus non-punitive approach. Until recently, the predominant
approach to managing medical error was the use of a punitive culture (Marx, 2001; Rosen
et al., 2010; Vogelsmeier et al., 2010). This method sought to identify and punish those
involved in adverse events regardless of their intent. Under this approach, many wellmeaning healthcare professionals were severely punished for their roles in these errors
(Marx, 2009). In addition, this system was typically driven by the severity of the event
with the most serious events receiving the majority of the attention, while little or no
concern was allocated to near-miss events or events without harm. This system of
punishment taught professionals to cover up their mistakes for fear of extreme or undo
retribution (Marx, 2001; Weiner et al., 2008). Ultimately this cover up does more harm
than good (Reason, 2000). An organization can only learn from events that are known;
therefore, if the majority of events are hidden there are few opportunities for
improvement and future prevention.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the more recently adopted non-punitive
culture. By eliminating the threat of punishment, this approach was meant to encourage
the free discussion of events so that the mistakes were out in the open (Nieva & Sorra,
2003; Wachter & Pronovost, 2009). Although this concept is favorably perceived in the
healthcare community, some have understood this phrase to mean that no form of
discipline was permitted (Connor et al., 2007; Wachter & Pronovost, 2009). The original
intent of the non-punitive culture was never meant to convey a total absence of discipline,
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but vague definitions and inconsistent guidelines contributed to the confusion
surrounding this terminology and its implementation in the healthcare field, leading
people to believe that non-punitive meant “blame-free” (Marx, 2001).
Person versus system approach. Events can also be viewed in terms of a person
approach or a systems approach. The person approach is essentially synonymous with
the punitive approach, in which others seek to place blame on individuals involved in the
events (Reason, 2000). The systems approach takes a different perspective: events occur
as a result of a system that has multiple breaking points. Reason (2000) explains this
concept using the example of Swiss cheese. In this example, each slice of cheese is
comparable to a level of defense in the system. Usually the accumulation of layers will
prevent errors from slipping through the holes; however, on occasion, conditions are
aligned in such a way that an error can move through each line of defense in succession,
ultimately resulting in an adverse event. When viewed in terms of Reason’s Swiss cheese
model, it is clear that punishing the last person in the chain does not fix the weaknesses in
the other layers. In order to repair the system and learn from mistakes, the system has to
be examined in its entirety.
Balancing a non-punitive approach with accountability. The challenge is to
develop a systems-approach culture, which would balance accountability so that the
system is fair to those involved in events and near misses (Beyea, 2004; Connor et al.,
2007; Marx, 2001; Reason, 2000; Sammer et al., 2010). These just culture advocates
believe that this balance will encourage better communication.
Openness of communication. Willingness to reveal information about adverse
events and near misses is critical to the just culture concept (Connor et al., 2007; Frankel

15

et al., 2006; Marx, 2001l; Sammer et al., 2010). Given that most adverse events will go
undetected unless individual healthcare professionals are willing to disclose this
information (Leape, 2001), hospital leaders must rely on their staff members to reveal
information about adverse events and near misses. However, negative experiences with
punitive consequences can hamper this willingness to speak up (Marx, 2001; Weiner et
al., 2008), limiting the opportunities to learn from errors. Just culture advocates believe
that the right balance of accountability is associated with open communication,
characterized by the staff’s willingness to report and discuss events.
Trust. In order for just culture to be effective, it requires healthcare professionals
to trust multiple aspects of the process: the peer level, the supervisor level, and the
organizational level. The staff members have to trust that their co-workers are sharing
information about events with the sole intent of improving patient safety, rather than
using this information to incriminate their peers (Barach & Small, 2000; Waring, 2005).
In addition, this system of trust requires an open and supportive relationship with
supervisors, which would allow an open discussion regarding the event in question (von
Thaden et al., 2005). Furthermore, the staff members have to believe that they will
receive fair treatment if involved in an event (Frankel et al., 2006; Sammer et al., 2010;
von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005; Weiner et al., 2008), which requires cooperation from
multiple parts of the organization, such as the staff members’ individual departments,
other departments involved in the event, the legal department, and human resources. The
staff members are more likely to trust the system if they believe that the organization is
treating each event as an opportunity for improvement (Frankel et al., 2006; Sammer et
al., 2010; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005).
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Continuous improvement. The ultimate goal of implementing a just culture is to
improve patient safety (Marx, 2001). Scholars agree that in order to accomplish this goal,
healthcare organizations must demonstrate a desire to learn from adverse events and
make changes based on the information they have received from the staff members
(Connor et al., 2007; Marx, 2001; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). Therefore, in addition to
collecting information about events, the data must also be analyzed and acted upon
(Connor et al., 2007; Wood & Nash, 2005).
Feedback and communication. As hospital leaders are able to make safety
improvement based on event reports, it is critical that they share this information with the
staff members – especially those staff members who have taken the time to provide
information about the events (Connor et al., 2007; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). This
information sharing could be viewed as a gesture of good faith and as evidence that the
hospital leaders are willing to share information, just as they have asked the staff
members to do.
Quality of the event reporting process. Numerous challenges associated with
implementing a just culture are related to trust and communication. However, without a
method to report information about events, the willingness to disclose these events is a
moot point; therefore, it is important to have a quality event reporting process (von
Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). Various types of reporting options have been discussed in
terms of mandatory vs. voluntary and paper vs. electronic, yet few authors have discussed
the importance of a quality process for sharing event information. The topic of reporting
process quality has been largely overlooked in the just culture literature and should be
included in future discussions regarding just culture.
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Summarizing just culture concepts. To synthesize current literature, the
following definition is offered: just culture describes an environment where professionals
believe they will receive fair treatment if they are involved an adverse event and trust the
organization to treat each event as an opportunity for improving safety. For the purposes
of the current study, just culture will be defined and measured in terms of the following
constructs: balance (composed of both non-punitive treatment as well as accountability),
openness of communication, trust, an overall goal of continuous improvement, feedback
and communication about events, and the quality of the event reporting process. For a list
of just culture authors and constructs, see Appendix A.
Outcomes associated with just culture. A just culture is said to have a wide
range of positive outcomes, such as increased safety compliance and participation
(Clarke, 2006) and a reduction in errors and injuries (Beyea, 2004; Connor et al., 2007;
Hofmann & Mark, 2006). However, the most widely touted benefit is related to error
reporting. Numerous authors assert the presence of a just culture should be accompanied
by an increase in the number of error reports (Beyea, 2004; Khatri, Brown, & Hicks,
2009; Reason, 2000). The practice of error reporting is critical when it comes to reducing
mistakes and improving healthcare quality (Kohn et al., 1999; Leape et al., 2002;
Nembhard et al., 2009). Previous errors are a rich source of information for healthcare
administrators looking to systematically reduce future errors (Leape et al., 2002;
Nembhard et al., 2009); however, healthcare organizations can only learn from events
that are known (Chassin et al., 2010; Kohn et al., 1999; Marx, 2001; Weiner et al., 2008).
Unfortunately, these learning opportunities are limited because the vast majority of
events go unreported (Nembhard et al., 2009; Wood & Nash, 2005). Leape (1997)
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estimates that only 2-3% of errors are reported and even then Marx claims “many
healthcare workers will only report that which they cannot conceal” (2001, p. 4). Given
that most events can be hidden, nearly all reporting is voluntary to some extent (Barach &
Small, 2000; Weiner et al., 2008). This phenomenon of under reporting may explain the
lack of improvement since the Institute of Medicine called attention to this issue in 1999
(Kohn et al., 1999; Leape & Berwick, 2005; Wachter, 2004); however, reporting in and
of itself does not improve error rates: in addition to collecting the data, the data must also
be analyzed, and acted upon (Wood & Nash, 2005).
Relationships with existing concepts. Overall, the concept of just culture has
been relatively unexplored in the traditional organizational and psychological literature;
therefore this concept has not been compared with other prominent and potentially related
constructs. It is important to distinguish the concept of just culture from the more general
term of safety culture and to understand how it relates to the concepts of crew resource
management and organizational justice.
Safety culture. Multiple just culture authors acknowledge that a basic safety
culture is a necessary foundation for establishing a just culture (von Thaden & Hoppes,
2005, & Weiner et al., 2008). Weiner et al. explain just culture is “an integral aspect of a
broader culture of safety” (p. 404). Just culture is best viewed not as a total divergence
from general safety culture work, but as an extension. As compared to the broader culture
of safety, just culture provides a unique contribution. Both acknowledge that errors will
happen and both are focused on reducing the number of adverse events; however, just
culture is geared towards evaluating what happens after an event occurs.
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In addition, just culture has only been considered in the context of “high hazard”
industries (such as healthcare and aviation), while general safety culture has been applied
to a wider range of workplaces. Most safety studies are concerned with the safety of the
employees, but understandably less concerned with the safety of what they are producing
or manufacturing. However, in the high hazard industries, the unit of production is a
person - in the form of a patient or an airline passenger. The focus of just culture extends
beyond the employees and increases the scope to include patients and passengers.
Crew resource management. Another concept related to the discussion of just
culture is crew resource management (CRM). CRM, like just culture, emerged from the
aviation industry and has recently been applied to healthcare settings. CRM focuses on
reducing error by calling attention to the situations that lead to error and encouraging
communication among team members (Oriol, 2006; Pizzi, Goldfarb, & Nash, 2001; Sax
et al., 2009). There are several similarities and between CRM and just culture in the
context of healthcare.
First, both CRM and just culture have the shared goal of improving safety for
patients through reducing errors. Furthermore, both approaches acknowledge errors are
inevitable. The focus is not on condemning errors, but rather on making strides to
decrease errors. In addition to these core similarities, CRM and just culture demonstrate
overlapping constructs. In particular, there is a shared focus on communication openness
and trust (Oriol, 2006; Pizzi, Goldfarb, & Nash, 2001; Sax et al., 2009). The CRM
method advocates for open communication, where every member of the team feels
comfortable calling attention to unsafe situations (Oriol, 2006; Pizzi, et al., 2001; Sax et
al., 2009). This construct is mirrored in the just culture literature (Connor et al., 2007;
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Frankel et al., 2006; Marx, 2001l; Sammer et al., 2010). This willingness to talk about
error is common to both approaches. The trust concept is closely related to open
communication – team members have to trust that the rest of their team will be receptive
to their concerns and suggestions in order for CRM to be effective (Oriol, 2006; Pizzi et
al., 2001; Sax et al., 2009) and for just culture to be effective as methods for improving
safety (Frankel et al., 2006; Sammer et al., 2010; von Thaden et al., 2005). In these
respects, the constructs of CRM and just culture demonstrate some overlap; however,
these areas diverge from this point.
CRM and just culture differ from one another in at least two key ways: the level
of scope and the process after an event has occurred. First, CRM focuses on the
individual and the team level. Communication and collaboration are encouraged within
teams (Oriol, 2006; Pizzi et al., 2001; Sax et al., 2009). In contrast, just culture focuses
on the organization as a whole, examining how not only individuals and teams play a role
in error reduction, but how departments, policies, equipment and systems might also
contribute to or prevent an error.
The primary difference between CRM and just culture is related to what happens
after an event has occurred. With CRM, this focus is limited to mitigation of immediate
consequences (Oriol, 2006). Other than limiting damage CRM does use discuss fair
treatment or future improvements. It is at this point that just culture clearly diverges from
CRM. Just culture is characterized by a focus on fairness for those involved in an error.
The emphasis here is on the individual perceptions of fairness during the process
following an event. The intent is to determine how and why an event occurred:
negligence, human error, or a systems error. This process lends itself to an evaluation of
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individual involvement, allowing the organization to determine the best course of action.
The goal is to demonstrate that the hospital is committed to learning from events and
making improvements based on the knowledge gained during the follow up evaluation
process. The results of the evaluation govern the next steps. For example, a systems-level
error might require multiple departments in the organization to work towards a solution.
On the other hand, some errors are specific to certain individuals, equipment, or work
groups. In these cases, CRM might be a useful tool and a compliment to just culture.
Overall, it is likely that CRM will continue to gain popularity in the healthcare
field. Pizzi et al. (2001) advocate for the use of CRM in healthcare, but caution that it
requires a supportive culture in order to be effective and successful. Just culture may fill
that role so that CRM is effectively functioning as its own component, tied into the
broader just culture.
Organizational justice. The primary exception to the lack of peer-reviewed just
culture literature is the work of Weiner et al. (2008), in which the authors acknowledge
the lack of information available on the just culture topic. In their discussion, Weiner et
al. present two key points relevant to the study and the discussion of just culture. First,
they suggest a framework for studying just culture that relies on an organizational justice
perspective. Their assertion is that the concept of just culture is most closely related to the
organizational justice literature based on the fact that both fields focus on employees’
perceptions of justice in the organization. Second, they assert that just culture should be
assessed at the individual level, focusing on each healthcare professional’s interpretation
of whether the event reporting process is just. Taken together, the work of Weiner et al.
(2008) indicates that individual perceptions of justice underlie the concept of just culture;
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therefore, just culture can be better understood by studying it through the lens of
organizational justice theory and at the level of the individual.
The concept of organizational justice addresses individual perceptions of justice
in the workplace and has four distinct tenets according to Weiner et al. (2008):
First, justice is a matter of perception. People may differ in what they consider
fair. [Justice scholars use the terms ‘‘justice’’ and ‘‘fairness’’ interchangeably.]
Second, justice is a pervasive concern in work place settings. . . . Third, justice is
a multidimensional construct. People care not only about the fairness of the
outcomes that they receive, but also about the fairness of the procedures used to
decide the outcomes. Moreover, people care about the way they are treated by
decision makers (i.e., the social aspects of decision-making processes). Finally,
organizational justice matters. That is, people’s perceptions of justice affect their
attitudes and behavior with respect to a variety of personal, social, and
organizational outcomes. (p. 406)
According to Weiner et al. (2008), the concepts of justice are parallel to the
justice perceptions at the core of the just culture approach. Positive perceptions of justice
have been linked to a range of positives outcomes in the workplace including improved
work performance, decreased counterproductive work behaviors and increased
organizational citizenship behaviors (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Weiner et al.
(2008) go on to speculate that the presence of a just culture is associated with similar
outcomes.
In Weiner et al.’s conceptual model (2008), individual perceptions of justice are
associated with a range of affective reactions, which ultimately lead to a series of
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behavioral reactions (see Figure 2). In particular, perceptions of justice are associated
with incident reporting (synonymous with event and error reporting). The authors argue
that three of these outcomes - decision compliance, employee silence and organizational
citizenship behaviors - are potentially representative of error reporting behavior. Health
professionals would be more likely to comply with reporting guidelines if they believe in
the organization’s tenets of justice: the punishment fits the crime, everyone is treated
fairly without being singled out, and each person is treated with respect (Weiner et al.,
2008). If the health professionals doubt this justice system, they would be more likely to
display employee silence, which would manifest as unreported events. Event reporting
could also be viewed as an organizational citizenship behavior due to the fact that is it not
usually a mandated contribution, but a proactive behavior benefiting the organization.
Based on this model, perceptions of organizational justice should be positively associated
with error reporting behaviors.

Figure 2. Weiner et al. (2008) conceptual model of the relationship between
organizational justice and behavioral outcomes.
It is important to point out that an increase in the number of reports does not
equate to an increase in the number of adverse events. Instead, it is acknowledged that
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only a small fraction of events are reported (Kohn et al., 1999; Leape & Berwick, 2005;
Wachter, 2004; Wood & Nash, 2005); therefore, the number of reports can increase
without suggesting a rise in the actual number of events. Based on this assertion, an
increase in the number of event reports is viewed as a positive outcome.
Weiner et al. (2008) theorize about the degree of similarity between
organizational justice and just culture; however, they acknowledge that without
additional work in the area of just culture proposed similarities and differences remain
speculative. In order to advance knowledge of the just culture concept, Weiner et al.
issued two specific calls for additional work, including (a) and assessment of just culture
as an individual level perception and (b) the development of specific guidelines for
promoting and fostering a just culture.
First, it is critical to explore individual perceptions of what constitutes a just
culture. Individual perceptions of justice may differ from person to person regardless of
the justice systems in place, and these varied perceptions can lead to a wide range of
differences in error reporting and patient safety behaviors (Weiner et al., 2008). In
addition, it is important to consider that “health professionals judge the fairness of
incident reporting systems based not just on the outcomes that they receive (distribution
rules), but also on the procedures used to decide the outcomes (procedural rules) and the
way that they are treated by decision makers (the social aspects of decision-making
processes)” (Weiner et al., 2008, p. 408) Therefore, an attempt to measure the presence of
a just culture should focus on individual perceptions of just culture, including the
procedures, outcomes and social aspects associated with it, rather than widespread
agreement or objective organizational practices (Weiner at al., 2008). Ultimately, the
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individual healthcare providers are the only ones who know whether a just culture exists,
but currently, there is no method for collecting this information.
Second, healthcare providers want to develop a just culture, but the literature
provides little to no advice regarding implementation. In their goal to develop a just
culture, hospital administrators need information regarding the components that
constitute a just culture. Weiner et al. (2008) called for a specification of the attributes
that define just culture so that healthcare organizations can identify areas to develop or
improve. Having such guidelines and prescriptions will enable those charged with
implementing a just culture to tackle it in terms of its components, rather than as a
nebulous, overarching concept.
The current study sought to respond to Weiner et al.’s (2008) call for greater
research attention directed toward the just culture concept. First, a primary goal of the
current study was to develop a reliable and valid measure of just culture. This measure
assessed perceptions of just culture at the individual level by surveying the healthcare
providers on the “sharp end” of the system. It is clear each individual’s perceptions have
to be taken into account in order to better understand just culture; therefore, this tool
assessed individual perceptions of the procedures, outcomes, and social considerations in
the context of the core just culture dimension. This tool can be used to assess how staff
members feel about the overall progress towards developing a just culture.
Second, the process for developing this measurement tool included an assessment
of the attributes that constitute just culture (balance, openness of communication, trust,
feedback and communication, quality of the error reporting system, and the goal of
continuous improvement). These tenets were reflected in the JCAT so that the hospital

26

administrator could not only use the JCAT to determine their progress towards an overall
culture of justice, but also to determine which individual components of just culture have
the most opportunity for improvement.
The Current Study
The presence of a just culture is thought to be accompanied by slue of benefits
ranging from an increase in error reporting to improved patient safety. Based on these
assertions, numerous hospitals are rapidly attempting to implement a just culture.
Unfortunately, the current literature on the topic does not reflect the pace of practice and
there is little information available on the antecedents, outcomes, and theory associated
with a just culture. Currently, there is no widely used method available to measure the
level of just culture in an organization. Developing this tool is a necessary first step on
the road to determining whether the presence of a just culture is associated with various
safety outcomes.
The purpose of the current study was to develop a tool for measuring individual
perceptions of just culture in a hospital environment. In order to develop a well-rounded
tool, the development process drew from current literature and included input from an
expert in the field of just culture. After it was developed, this tool was administered to
staff at a local hospital and responses were used to provide initial evidence for the
psychometric properties of this scale. The ultimate goal of this work is to produce a tool
for measuring just culture that can be used to assess the current level of just culture at
hospitals across the country.
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Method
Developing the Just Culture Assessment Tool (JCAT)
Survey Development Framework. The process for developing the Just Culture
Assessment Tool (JCAT) was based on Hinkin’s (1998) six-step framework for survey
development. The current study undertook the first four steps in this process: 1) item
generation, 2) questionnaire administration, 3) initial item reduction, and 4) confirmatory
factor analysis.
Item and Dimension Generation. Step one in the measurement process was to
generate items, which entailed: 1) developing the items for the survey and 2) assessing
these items for content validity. In the current study, this process also included
developing the just culture dimensions as a first step. This first process used a deductive
approach to item generation (Hinkin 1998), which relied on theoretical research and
expertise to develop the items. Several methods were used to develop the theoretical and
conceptual basis for the survey items. Specifically, the available literature on just culture
was reviewed and synthesized to inform the theoretical foundation from which to
generate the survey items. Furthermore, an expert on the topic of just culture collaborated
during this process and provided feedback on the just culture dimensions that had been
developed from the theoretical research.
Just Culture Dimensions. From this process, six dimensions emerged: balance
(composed of both non-punitive treatment as well as accountability), trust, openness of
communication, quality of the event reporting process, feedback and communication
about events, and an overall goal of continuous improvement.
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Balance. Just culture is meant to balance non-punitive treatment with
accountability. This balance is at the core of the just culture concept. Questions addressed
individual perceptions of fair treatment within the hospital as it relates to errors and error
reporting.
Trust. In order to discuss events, employees have to trust that their supervisors
and the organization will treat the employees fairly. In addition, the employees would
have to trust that the organization would adhere to its guiding principles when evaluating
events and the people involved in those events. Furthermore, this approach requires trust
in peer-peer relationships and supervisor-supervisee relationships. Questions for this
dimension addressed the extent to which individuals trust the organization, their
supervisors, and their co-workers.
Openness of communication. Open communication refers to the willingness of
individuals to communicate event information upwards to supervisors and hospital
administrators. These questions addressed willingness to reveal events, share events
information, and to make suggestions for improvement within the unit or the
organization.
Quality of the event reporting process. A quality event reporting system is key
when it comes to gathering information about events. The quality of the system,
including accessibility and ease of use is an important component of just culture.
Questions addressed the perceived quality of the event reporting system (which includes
the process of entering reports and the ability to follow up on these reports), whether
employees are given time to report, and to what extent the employees believe the
reporting system is monitored and maintained.

29

Feedback and communication about events. As part of the just culture process,
hospital supervisors and administrators should be communicating with staff members
about the event outcomes. Questions in this section addressed whether the employees
believe the organization does an effective job of sharing event information about the
events and the outcome of evaluating events.
Overall goal of continuous improvement. The organization has to demonstrate a
commitment to using event information in order to improve patient safety, which is the
ultimate goal of the just culture approach. Questions addressed whether employees
believe the organization as a whole demonstrates a goal of continuous improvement,
characterized by a willingness to learn from events and make improvements to the
hospital system.
Just Culture Items. After the dimensions were identified, approximately 70
healthcare professionals informally contributed to the development of the items and
concepts through a series of discussions about the concepts of just culture and how it
might apply to their workplace. Their feedback, in combination with the theoretical
resources and the expert’s opinion was used to develop items for the just culture tool.
Content validity assessment. The next phase in the item generation process was
to conduct an informal content validity assessment. Several healthcare professionals were
asked to review the initial list of questions and provide feedback. Specifically they were
asked whether any of the questions were confusing and if any of the items seemed
unrelated to the others. Their feedback was used to further refine the survey.
Materials
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Just Culture Assessment Tool (JCAT). Following the previously described
survey development process, 31 items were retained with the goal of assessing the six
dimensions of just culture: balance (e.g., “Staff members fear disciplinary action when
involved in an event”), trust (e.g., “I trust that I will be treated fairly when involved in an
event”), openness of communication (e.g., “Staff can easily approach supervisors with
ideas and concerns”), quality of the event reporting process (e.g., “The event reporting
system is easy to use”), feedback and communication (e.g., “We don’t know about events
that happen in our unit”), and an overall goal of continuous improvement (e.g., “The
hospital sees events as opportunities for improvement”). As the examples demonstrate,
the JCAT includes both positively and negatively worded questions. For a complete list
of the items and their respective dimensions, see Appendix B.
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC). In order to gain access to
the hospital’s patient care staff, the Just Culture Assessment Tool was administered in
tandem with another survey at the request of the hospital administration. Specifically, the
participants also completed the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture from the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (see Appendix C).
Combined survey: HSPSC and JCAT. The participants completed both the
HSPSC and the JCAT, but these surveys were deployed in combination as one
continuous survey. The Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture was administered first
and the Just Culture Assessment tool comprised the second half of this combined survey.
Most participants were able to complete the combined survey in less than 20 minutes.
Participants
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The current study included patient care providers from a pediatric hospital. All
health care providers with direct access to patients (as defined by the hospital) were asked
to participate via an email invitation. Approximately 1,000 healthcare providers worked
at this location: this figure included nurses, physicians, pharmacists, and other patient
care staff members. The guidelines for item to response ratios indicate a 1:7 ratio is a
conservative cut off requirement when conducting a confirmatory factor analysis (Hinkin
1998). Given that the current survey contained 31 items, the minimum acceptable
response rate was 217 respondents, which would be a 22% response rate for this site. In
the current study, 404 individuals completed the survey, yielding a response rate of
approximately 40%.
Procedure
The just culture survey was designed to be administered in an electronic format to
the hospital staff using a SurveyMonkey account (see Appendix D for screen shots of the
final survey). All potential participants were recruited using two methods: emails and
electronic newsletters. Both formats explained the purpose of the survey, asked
participants to complete the survey and included instructions for accessing the survey.
The participants received two emails from the hospital’s Clinical Director and one to two
emails from their respective department heads (ex: Chief Pharmaceutical Officer, Chief
Nursing Officer). In addition to these emails, all participants received four reminders via
the hospital’s daily newsletter. The survey remained open for 16 days to gather
responses.
All participants were provided with an electronic informed consent document that
addressed the purpose and the nature of the study. Each participant had to indicate one of
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two options before proceeding past the informed consent page: either they agreed to the
terms and wanted to participate or they could choose to exit the survey. This document
explained participation was voluntary and the survey could be exited at any time without
penalty for the participant. In addition, they were informed that their results would be
anonymous and no attempt would be made to link the responses to an individual
participant. This document also explained that there were no known risks associated with
participating in the survey and this document provided a method for contacting the
researchers if the participants had any questions about participation or the purpose of the
study.
Results
Each item was evaluated for missing or insufficient data. Missing data were
treated conservatively. Rather than estimating or replacing large amounts of missing data,
cases were removed from the analysis if a participant skipped more than two of the 31
questions. Of the 404 cases collected, 366 were included in the primary analysis and 38
were rejected using the cutoff criteria.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Given that the JCAT was created to assess six conceptually important dimensions
of just culture, confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) techniques were used to assess several
alternative models as follows:
Model 1 (6-factor model). The first model tested featured six factors (the
proposed dimensions of just culture: balance, trust, communication, event reporting,
feedback, and continuous improvement), with items loading factors as presented in
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Appendix B. Model 1 represents the model that was proposed to explain responses to the
JCAT items.
Model 2 (7-factor model). The second model tested featured the same 31 items
as Model 1; however, a higher order factor, just culture, was added to the model.
Model 3 (1-factor model). The third proposed model was the simplest: all 31
items loaded onto a single factor (just culture).
Of the three models, the 7-factor model demonstrated the best fit when compared
with the 6-factor model and the 1-factor model (see Table 1); however, fit indexes were
lower than commonly accepted rules of thumb (i.e., CFI > .95, RMSEA < .03; Hu &
Bentler, 2009). Because of this lack of fit, the analysis shifted from a purely theorydriven confirmatory approach to an exploratory approach with a theoretical base.

Table 1
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model Comparison for Models 1, 2, and 3
x2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

Model 1
6 factors

1158.892

398

< 0.001

0.829

0.072

Model 2
7 factors

1165.975

422

< 0.001

0.833

0.069

1378.104

433

< 0.001

0.788

0.077

Model

Model 3
1 factor

Exploratory Analysis
This exploratory approach was undertaken with the goal of improving model fit,
while also maintaining a component of theoretical integrity. Any suggested changes to
the model during the exploratory process were evaluated using a two-step process based
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on the work of Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Each proposed change to the model was
evaluated to determine whether the change made theoretical sense through either
reassigning items to different latent variables or dropping items.
Items were identified for reassignment based on results of the Lagrange Multiplier
Test, which suggested adding several paths. Items were only assigned to an alternate
factor if the item was conceptually consistent with the other items associated with that
factor. Following this logic, items were reassigned to the suggested dimension and fit
indices were compared with the fit indices from the original models. It should be noted
that variables were not allowed to cross load onto multiple factors: the path for each item
could be reassigned, but not dually assigned. Of the multiple suggested paths, two of the
reassigned items (variables 21 and 31) led to improvements in overall model fit. The
revised 7-factor model showed improved fit indices when compared with the original 7factor model (e.g., the CFI increased from .833 to .850) (See Table 2).

Table 2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model Comparison for Revised 7-factor Model
Model
Original
7 Factor Model
Revised
7 Factor Model
(31 items)
Revised
7 Factor Model
(27 items)

x2

df

p

CFI

RMSEA

1165.975

422

< 0.01

0.833

0.069

1092.034

422

< 0.01

0.850

0.066

821.817

312

< 0.01

0.871

0.067

The revised 7-factor model provided a better fit; however, the CFI fit index was
still below common “rule of thumb” cutoffs. Having exhausted options for path additions,
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the next step was to eliminate those items that did not make a meaningful contribution to
the survey. All parameter loadings were significant, but some of these loadings were
noticeably lower than the rest of the items. That is, most of the parameter loadings were
greater than .500, but three items had loadings below .400; therefore, these items
underwent an additional review. Because the items were assessed on a 7-point scale, the
mid-point of this scale allowed participants to indicate a neutral response. These three
items had a high neutral response rate from participants, where more than 25% of the
participants selected a neutral response. Upon further review, it is possible that
respondents might have seen these items as confusing or not applicable. Items with a
neutral response rate of 25% or greater were removed from the analysis, which increased
model fit, increasing the CFI from .850 to .871 (see Table 2). Though other models may
have produced better empirical fit, these adjustments would have compromised the
theoretical integrity of the instrument. Based on this information, the revised 7-factor
model with 27 items was determined to be the best fitting and most theoretically sound
model for the current data.
Table 3 lists the loadings for each item in the revised 7-factor model with 27
items. As previously mentioned, variables 17 and 27 were reassigned from their original
factors. All factor loadings were significant at p < .05.
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Table 3
Survey Item Loadings for the Revised 7-factor Model with 27 Items
Variable
The management does a good job of sharing information
about events (v1)
We don’t know about events that happen in our unit (v2)
I often hear about event conclusions and outcomes (v3)
Staff feel uncomfortable discussing events with supervisors
(v4)
Supervisors respect suggestions from staff members (v5)
Staff can easily approach supervisors with ideas and concerns
(v6)
If I had a good idea for making an improvement, I believe my
suggestion would be carefully evaluated and taken seriously.
(v7)
I trust supervisors to do the right thing** (v27)
Staff members are usually blamed when involved in an event
(v8)
Staff members fear disciplinary action when involved in an
event (v9)
When an event occurs, the follow up team looks at each step
in the process to determine how the event happened. (v10)
I feel comfortable entering reports about events in which I was
involved. (v11)
Staff members use event reporting to “tattle” on each other. **
(v17)
Coworkers discourage each other from reporting events (v12)
The event reporting system is easy to use (v13)
Reports are being evaluated and reviewed after they’re entered
(v14)
I’m given time to enter event reports during work hours (v15)
My supervisors encourage me to report (v16)

Feedback and
Communication
.743*

Openness of
Communication

Balance

Quality of Error
Reporting Process

.859*
.749*
.583*
.749*
.707*
.714*

.703*
.857*
.809*
.836*
.662*
.734*
.560*
.684*
.757*
.744*
.725*
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Continuous
Improvement

Trust

Table 3 (Continued)
Survey Item Loadings for the Revised 7-factor Model with 27 Items
Variable

Feedback and
Communication

There are improvements because of event reporting (v18)
The hospital devotes (time/energy/resources) toward making
patient safety improvements (v19)
By entering reports, I’m making the hospital a safer place for
the patients (v20)
The hospital sees events as opportunities for improvement
(v21)
Each employee is given a fair and objective follow up process
regardless of his/her involvement in the event. (v22)
I trust that the hospital will handle events fairly (v23)
The hospital adheres to its own rules and policies (v24)
I feel comfortable entering report where others were involved.
(v25)
I am uncomfortable with others entering reports about events
in which I was involved. (v26)
* Indicates significance at p < .05 ** Indicates item reassigned

Openness of
Communication

Balance

Quality of Error
Reporting Process

Continuous
Improvement
.641*
.524*

Trust

.566*
.702*
.845*
.829*
.668*
.700*
.532*
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Reliability Analysis
Table 4 lists the internal consistency estimates for each dimension of the JCAT.
Although most of the dimensions had a Cronbach’s alpha greater than .700, one of the
dimensions, quality of the event reporting process, produced a clearly lower reliability.
Had the analysis been purely exploratory, this dimension would be been removed from
the JCAT to improve model fit; however, this dimension is considered theoretically
essential to the understanding of just culture (von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005). This
theoretical basis warrants inclusion of this dimension in the JCAT.

Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliabilities for Just Culture Dimensions
Dimension
1. Feedback and
Communication
2. Openness of
Communication
3. Balance
4. Quality of Event
Reporting Process
5. Continuous
Improvement
6. Trust

Number of items

M

SD

4.69

1.35

.7396

3

5.51

1.17

.8599

5

5.19

1.10

.7789

5

5.63

0.90

.6323

5

6.12

0.77

.7782

4

5.38

1.01

.7515

5

Additional Analyses
In addition to the factor analyses and reliability analysis, a correlational analysis
was used to explore the relationships among the dimensions of just culture and error
reporting behaviors. No significant relationships emerged among the just culture
dimensions and the error reporting behaviors (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Correlations for Just Culture Dimensions and Error Reporting
Dimension
1. Feedback and
Communication
2. Openness and
Communication
3. Balance
4. Quality of Event
Reporting Process
5. Continuous
Improvement
6. Trust
7. Near Misses
8. Events that Reached
the Patient

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

.520**

-

.434*

.675**

-

.444**

.604**

.675*

-

.499**

.662**

.608*

.602**

-

.460**

.641**

.714**

.636*

.627**

-

-.092

.001

.064

.043

.030

-.002

-

-.047

-.017

.078

.059

.039

.045

.517**

-

** Indicates significance at p < .01

Discussion
Dr. Lucian Leape, a leading expert on medical error, testified before Congress
that “The single greatest impediment to error prevention is that we punish people for
making mistakes’’ (Leape, 1999). This quote sums up the spirit of the just culture
approach. Event information is critical to improving the quality of the healthcare system
(Chassin et al., 2010; Kohn et al., 1999; Marx, 2001; Weiner et al., 2008). Without
accurate and comprehensive event information, those in healthcare organizations cannot
learn from their mistakes and therefore cannot prevent similar mistakes from occurring in
the future. Unfortunately, the vast majority of this information is concealed by those
involved in the events (Leape, 1997; Marx, 2001) not because of a disregard for patient
safety, but because of fear of being punished for their mistakes (Reason, 2000; Weiner et
al., 2008). The ability to conceal this information coupled with a fear of punishment has
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created a system in which events are not only hidden, but also repeated. In order to
encourage event reporting, healthcare organizations need to develop safe and supportive
cultures that emphasize a fair and just approach for managing adverse events.
The just culture approach focuses on evaluating events using a balanced system,
which takes into account whether an event occurred due to a systems-level issue or due to
the actions of an individual (Marx, 2001; Reason, 1997). Just culture scholars agree that
this framework should reduce the fear associated with involvement with adverse events;
therefore, they believe that a just culture would be accompanied by an increase in
voluntary error reporting (Nieva & Sorra, 2003; Wachter & Pronovost, 2009). This logic
has compelled numerous hospital leaders to seek methods for developing and growing a
just culture within their organizations (Beyea, 2004; Weiner et al., 2008); however, there
has been no published research that demonstrates whether a just culture is associated with
valued outcomes. This research gap can be attributed to the fact that there has been no
method for assessing the existence of just culture in a healthcare setting. Without a tool to
measure just culture, healthcare leaders and scholars have not been able to explore the
development of just culture or the associated benefits. This issue is further complicated
by the fact that just culture has neither a concise definition in the available literature nor a
clear list of its core dimensions (Weiner et al., 2008).
The purpose of the current study was to design a measure of just culture.
Following recommendations of Hinkin (1998) the process began by developing a clear,
concise definition of just culture. For present purposes, just culture was defined as an
environment in which professionals believe they will receive fair treatment if they are
involved in an adverse event and trust the organization to treat each event as an
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opportunity for improving safety. Through this process six dimensions of just culture
were identified: balance, openness of communication, feedback and communication,
trust, continuous improvement, and quality of the event reporting process.
The cornerstone concept of just culture is that of balance between non-punitive
treatment with accountability. This approach is focused on determining whether an error
occurred as the result of a system-level breakdown in the process of providing quality
care. Events that happen as a result of the system should not lead to punishment of a
single individual because the event was beyond the control of a single person. Openness
of communication refers to individuals’ willingness to reveal information about adverse
events and near misses. In return, it is expected that the hospital leaders focus on
feedback and communication by sharing information about events and improvements
related to these events. It is especially important that this information is shared with those
staff members who have taken the time to report the event. In order for just culture to be
effective, it requires healthcare professional to trust multiple aspects of the process: the
peer level, the supervisor level, and the organization level. Without a system of trust,
people might withhold information about events for fear of retribution. The process of
continuous improvement is also key to the concept of just culture. The goal of the just
culture approach is to collect and use event information for the purpose of improving
patient safety. This process is ongoing and requires participation from multiple levels of
the organizational. Finally, willingness to share event information is a mute point unless
healthcare professionals have a reliable method for sharing and communicating this
information. A quality event reporting process is an important aspect of facilitating
communication within the just culture framework.
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The preceding six dimensions were derived from just culture literature and served
as the conceptual foundation upon which the proposed measure was constructed. The
following sections present a summary of the primary results, limitations, theoretical and
practical implications, and directions for future research.
Summary of Current Results
Three models were tested using a confirmatory factor analysis: 1-factor model (all
items loaded onto a single dimension), 6-factor model (the six dimensions of just culture)
and 7-factor model (the six dimensions of just culture with a higher order just culture
factor). Of these models, the 7-factor model demonstrated the best fit (CFI = .833);
however, the fit indices were lower than the generally accepted limits (i.e., CFI > .95; Hu
& Bentler, 2009). In order to improve model fit, analyses shifted from a purely theorydriven confirmatory approach to using fit indices and parameter estimates to construct the
strongest, best fitting model. This approach yielded a model that included 7 dimensions
(CFI = .871).
The 7-factor model provided the best fit when compared with the 1-factor and 6factor models. The 7-factor model had a higher order factor structure: the six dimensions
of just culture loaded onto a single higher order factor. This finding supports the idea that
just culture is a higher order concept, which encompasses six distinct dimensions:
balance, openness of communication, feedback and communication, trust, continuous
improvement, and quality of the event reporting process. Studying just culture in the
context of these dimensions provides opportunities for conceptualizing the just culture
approach.
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Studying just culture in the context of the 7-factor model has several advantages.
First, it incorporates all six originally proposed dimensions of just culture as distinct
components of a just culture work environment. Advocates of the just culture concept
have been in agreement that just culture consists of multiple components (Connor et al.,
2007; Khatri et al., 2009; von Thaden & Hoppes, 2005; Weiner et al., 2008), but varied in
their explanations and interpretations of those dimensions. Through exploring and
synthesizing the current literature, the six core dimensions were identified and reflected
in the JCAT. Therefore, the current 7-factor model is a reflection and synthesis of the
current literature available on the discussion regarding just culture dimensions.
Second, this 7-factor model features just culture as a higher-order concept
encompassing the dimensions of just culture. This indicates that just culture exists as an
overarching concept, characterized by its six distinct dimensions. Weiner et al., (2008)
called for a method of studying just culture that allowed researchers to understand how
individual healthcare providers differed in their preferences and perceptions of justice
systems. Studying just culture in this manner allows for the measurement and
interpretation of different aspects of just culture and how healthcare professionals might
value or struggle with each dimension.
Limitations
Several limitations are present in the current study. First, the same sample was
used for scale development and testing psychometric properties, which is not
recommended (Hinkin, 1998). This practice may result in a scale that is sample-specific.
Future research should administer the survey to another sample that is representative of
the population and compare the goodness of fit indices to the original work. Future
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research should also administer the survey in a different location to ensure that the
sample is unique and does not contain any duplicate respondents.
Second, the respondents were asked to self-report the number of times they
disclosed an error. These error reporting behaviors were gathered via self-report as part of
the survey. It is acknowledged that this method is not ideal; however, it was not possible
to link participants’ survey responses to their actual reports in the current study. This
issue is further complicated by the fact that the very nature of the survey is attempting to
discern the staff’s perceptions of fairness and trust. Coercing the staff to provide
identifying information could influence their perceptions of trust, which would confound
the survey results and potentially alter their overall perceptions of hospital culture.
Third, this survey was administered in tandem with another survey. The Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality regularly asks hospitals to administer the Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC). This survey has several questions that were
similar to those in the just culture tool, potentially biasing or confusing the respondents.
For example, the HSPSC includes the item, “Staff feel like their mistakes are held against
them” and the JCAT lists a similar item, “Staff members fear disciplinary action when
involved in an event”. The JCAT items were constructed following Hinkin’s framework
and the HSPSC culture items were purposefully not considered during the construction of
the JCAT so as not to bias development of the individual items. If the participants noticed
similarities across the surveys, it might have biased their responses. It is possible that
they might have skipped over familiar questions or attributed greater importance to
concepts that were repeated. In the future, the JCAT would ideally be administered
separate from any other survey, so as not to confuse or bias the respondents.
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Implications
Theoretical. The concept of just culture has quickly grown in popularity among
healthcare leaders, but research on the topic has been stagnant. Until recently, the just
culture concept has been “siloed” in the healthcare field, but recent work is bridging this
field to existing psychological and organizational concepts. In particular, Weiner at al.
(2008) highlighted core similarities between just culture and the well-established concept
of organizational justice. Both focus on individual perceptions of justice in the
workplace; therefore, Weiner at al. asserted that just culture would be enhanced by
equating it to the theories and outcomes associated with organizational justice. Ultimately
healthcare professionals weigh the fairness of the disciplinary process of event reporting
based not only on the outcomes, but also the procedures and social aspects associated
with the process. If individuals believe in the justice of the system, they are more likely to
display a range of safety-related behaviors. According to the authors, three of these
behavior categories - decision compliance, employee silence, and organizational
citizenship behaviors – would be likely to encompass aspects of voluntary error reporting
(Weiner et al., 2008). The work of Weiner et al. indicates that just culture concepts may
share some of the antecedents and outcomes associated with these areas. Tying the
concept of error reporting to these existing fields provides a range of options for future
research to explore the relationships among these areas.
Furthermore, a strong safety culture in the workplace has a positive influence on
individual safety behaviors in multiple industries (Clarke, 2006; Neal et al., 2000; Zohar,
2000) including healthcare organizations (Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Mardon et al., 2010).
Just culture is best seen as an extension of the safety culture literature, rather than a
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divergence. As Neal et al. (2000) described, the presence of a strong safety culture is
associated with a range of positive safety outcomes, including safety participation. As
previously discussed, both voluntary error reporting and safety participation require
taking extra steps beyond normal work expectations in order to proactively contribute to
an environment of safety.
Weiner et al. (2008) believe that it is the individual perceptions of justice that are
at the core of the just culture approach. This theory is consistent with psychological
climate research, which argues that each person interprets his or her work environment
differently (James et al., 1978). Employees in the same work environment have different
interpretations of the workplace and these differences are meaningful (James et al.,
1978). Therefore just culture is best conceptualized as an individual-level concept,
focusing on how each healthcare professional interprets the system for managing adverse
events. The JCAT was designed to collect individual-level interpretations of the
workplace and future research should explore the relationship between perceptions of just
culture and individual-level outcomes. In addition, this level of information will inform
healthcare leaders about the current state of just culture within their hospitals.
Identifying the dimensions associated with just culture affords multiple research
opportunities. Weiner et al. (2008) acknowledged, “the possibility exists that the justice
dimensions and rules identified in other studies do not adequately capture the
distinctiveness of the healthcare setting generally or the incident reporting context
specifically” (p. 410). Furthermore, the authors called for researchers to determine what
dimensions are associated with a fair and just incident reporting process (just culture) and
whether these dimensions are related to (or overlap) the dimensions associated with
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organizational justice: “whether new justice dimension and rules are needed to reflect the
distinctive context of healthcare delivery” (p. 410). In addition, is it unknown whether
healthcare professionals differ in what aspects of justice are of primary importance
(Weiner et al., 2008). Studying just culture in terms of its dimensions (rather than as a
singular concept) provides researchers with an opportunity to explore these differences
and potentially develop incident reporting systems that are best suited to the healthcare
providers’ preferences and interpretations of fairness. Defining the dimensions associated
with just culture was an initial step towards addressing these goals.
Another popular topic in the healthcare literature is the concept of crew resource
management, which focuses on improving teamwork and communication in healthcare
units (Oriol, 2006; Pizzi et al., 2001; Sax et al., 2009). Although there are similarities
between the constructs associated with just culture and CRM in terms of communication
and error reduction, the scope of these two approaches is different. CRM focuses on the
team or unit level, while just culture requires cooperation across the organization. CRM
needs a supportive culture in order to be successful (Pizzi et al., 2001) and the just culture
approach might fill this role. Future research should examine whether the success of
CRM initiatives is associated with just culture environments. The overarching constructs
of trust, communication, and continuous improvement associated with just culture would
provide a solid framework for instituting a CRM approach for teams within a hospital
setting.
Practical Implications. Currently, many hospital leaders claim the existence of a
just culture within their hospital. This assertion is problematic for multiple reasons. First,
numerous hospitals have claimed the existence of a just culture; however, without
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assessing individual perceptions, it is not possible to know whether a just culture exists
(Weiner et al., 2008). Healthcare leaders are urged to survey their healthcare professional
to determine the extent to which a just culture exists in their facility.
Second, the idea of achieving a just culture is a misnomer – developing a just
culture is an ongoing process of continuous improvement and culture management.
Assuming that no form of safety culture is perfect, the quest for improvement should be
an ongoing goal. This concept is reflected in one of the core constructs of the just culture
approach. The focus on continuous improvement is built into the concept.
Third, cultivating a culture is about more than policies on paper. As with all types
of culture, its existence cannot simply be declared. Culture is a combination of policy,
practice and perceptions – the policies to pursue and support the culture, the practice of
fairly evaluating events and making proactive and continuous improvements to patients’
safety, and having these goals reflected by the hospital employees’ perceptions of the
system and characterized by their willingness to share events and engage in the process.
Given that it is unrealistic to expect employees to work without making mistakes,
the focus of a just culture is not on prohibiting mistakes or expecting perfection (Reason,
2000). Instead, just culture is meant to be a supportive culture that encourages reporting
by removing the fear of unjust blame and punishment through emphasizing a focus on
safety improvement. If this holds true, the presence of a just culture would be associated
with an increase in reporting events and a willingness to reveal and discuss errors.
Future Directions
Numerous research opportunities accompany the exploration of the just culture
concept. The first step in this process is to further evaluate and refine the Just Culture
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Assessment Tool. Next, the JCAT should be used in an applied research setting to
determine what other factors are associated with the presence of a just culture in a
healthcare facility.
Refining the JCAT. Support for the JCAT was not as strong as hoped; therefore,
it is recommended that researchers explore ways to improve the current tool. The survey
should be administered at a different hospital to determine whether the current lack of fit
was the result of a site-specific issue or whether these issues stem from the measurement
tool itself. After the model has been refined and evaluated, it is recommended that
researchers focus on completing the remaining two steps of Hinkin’s (1998) framework
for developing a survey: validation and replication. It is recommended that the JCAT be
cross-validated on another sample (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) using respondents from a
different hospital. Ideally, this process would provide support for the current model or
provide insight into how this model might be improved. After the model has been
evaluated and refined, it should be replicated in order to further assess the JCAT.
Future applications of the JCAT. Currently, there is no widely used method for
measuring just culture in a healthcare setting, which means that hospitals have no method
for assessing their progress toward pursuing a just culture. After the tool has been refined
and replicated, researchers should assess the extent to which a just culture exists in
particular healthcare settings. This will enable researchers to explore whether a just
culture is accompanied by other factors related to patient safety. Advocates of just culture
believe that it will be accompanied by an increase in error reporting and an improved
patient safety (Beyea, 2004; Connor et al., 2007; Dekker, 2009; Frankel et al., 2006;
Leape et al., 2002; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Marx, 2001; Reason, 2001; Wachter &
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Pronovost, 2009), yet currently there is no published research in support of these claims.
The JCAT is the first method of its kind for assessing just culture; therefore, using the
JCAT provides an opportunity to explore the claim that just culture is associated with
error reporting and a range of patient safety factors.
In addition, regular assessments will provide other opportunities for practical use.
If just culture is assessed regularly, it will allow individual hospitals to measure their
progress over time, providing a method for understanding the role of just culture in their
own hospital. Second, the JCAT has the potential to provide benchmarking opportunities
for hospitals across the U.S. Currently, AHRQ’s Hospital Survey on Patient Safety
Culture (HSPSC) is used at more than 500 hospitals across the U.S., allowing hospitals to
benchmark their own safety culture efforts with those of peer hospitals. It is intended that
the JCAT will follow a similar model and will provide an opportunity to study variations
in just culture at multiple hospitals across the country.
Additional methods of assessment. The use of surveys can provide useful insight
into the inner workings of an organization; however, there are other methods that can be
used to gain additional information about perceptions of the workplace. Researchers
could consider interviews or focus groups as methods for collecting data. These
approaches might yield deeper or richer explanations of the values and practices within
the organization. In particular, using qualitative data from focus groups can highlight
barriers to reporting and perceptions of fairness beyond what a survey can assess (Jeffe et
al., 2004). Furthermore, direct observation could reveal other factors that might influence
just culture or error reporting, which might have gone unnoticed otherwise. In addition,
researchers should consider the use of vignettes as a method for understanding error
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reporting. Using this practice, researchers present a series of hypothetical scenarios and
ask respondents whether each event would warrant reporting (Taylor et al., 2004). This
approach could help researchers better understand what types of events or situational
characteristics might prompt or prohibit reporting among healthcare professionals.
Conclusion
Just culture has become a prominent fixture in healthcare – both in practice at
healthcare facilities and in the popular literature. Unfortunately the majority of the
available literature provides only speculative support for just culture and focuses
primarily on the details of the concept rather than on measuring it or its outcomes.
Numerous benefits, including improved patient safety, are thought to be associated with
the development of a just culture; however, there has been no research in support of these
relationships. Researchers can use the Just Culture Assessment Tool as a foundation for
future work related to measuring the extent to which a just culture exists in a healthcare
facility. In addition, healthcare researchers will have the opportunity to explore whether
just culture is accompanied by event reporting, error reduction, and ultimately an
improvement in patient safety. Only additional empirically-based research will be able to
determine whether the just culture approach is as promising as it appears.
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Appendix A
Just culture constructs
Article
Connor
Creating a Fair and just
culture: One Institution’s
Path Toward
Organizational Change
(2007)
Frankel
Fair and just culture: Tools
to Achieve High Reliability
(2006)
Marx
Patient Safety and the
“Just Culture”: A Primer
for Health Care Executives
(2001)
Sammer et al.
What is Patient Safety
Culture? A Review of the
Literature
(2010)
von Thaden
Measuring a Just Culture in
Healthcare Professionals
(2005)

Construct
Constructive feedback and
analysis
Objective analysis
Fair-minded treatment
Willingness to reveal error
Willingness to learn from
error
Feel safe and supported
when voicing concerns
Willingness to expose
weaknesses
Accountability
Balanced approach

Attributed to Marx

Non-punitive
Accountability

Willingness to speak up
Willingness to learn from
mistakes
Blame free
Disclosure
Non-punitive reporting
No at-risk behaviors
Systems – not individuals
Trust
Reporting Systems
Response and Feedback
Accountability
Basic Safety

Weiner
The Meaning of Justice in
Safety Incident Reporting
(2008)

Notes
Giving constructive feedback and
critical analysis in skillful ways
When evaluating each event
For those involved in events
Upwards in the organization

Fair treatment
Reinforces four core tenets
of Safety culture
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Does the organization have one, is it
used, do people feel safe using it?
Are the reports used? If so, how? Is
that information shared?
Equal accountability, blame
favoritism, honest mistakes
Commitment to basic safety
Non-punitive when appropriate
Accountability when appropriate
Trust
Human error is inevitable
Errors happen in patterns
Error patterns
Depends upon open communication

Appendix B
Original JCAT survey items
Balance (Non-punitive & Accountability)
• Staff members are usually blamed when involved in an event
• Staff members fear disciplinary action when involved in an event
• The disciplinary process regarding involvement in an event is too lax
• There are too few consequences for those involved in events
• The hospital uses a fair and balanced system when evaluating staff involvement in
events
• When an event occurs, the follow up team looks at each step in the process to
determine how the event happened.
• I feel comfortable entering reports about events in which I was involved.
Trust
•
•
•
•
•

I trust supervisors to do the right thing
I trust that the hospital will handle events fairly
I trust that I will be treated fairly when involved in an event.
The hospital adheres to its own rules and policies
I am uncomfortable with others entering reports about events in which I was
involved.
• I feel comfortable entering report where others were involved.

Openness of communication (bottom up)
• Supervisors respect suggestions from staff members
• Staff can easily approach supervisors with ideas and concerns
• Staff feel uncomfortable discussing events with supervisors
• If I had a good idea for making an improvement, I believe my suggestion would
be carefully evaluated and taken seriously.
Quality of the event reporting process
• The event reporting system is easy to use
• I’m given time to report during work hours
• My supervisors encourage me to report
• Reports are being evaluated and reviewed after they’re entered
• Coworkers discourage each other from reporting events
Feedback and communication about events (top down)
• The management does a good job of sharing information about events
• I often hear about event conclusions and outcomes
• It is easy access to information about reports
• We don’t know about events that happen in our unit
Overall goal of continuous improvement
• The hospital sees events as opportunities for improvement
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•
•
•
•

There are improvements because of event reporting
The hospital devotes (time/energy/resources) toward making patient safety
improvements
By entering reports, I’m making the hospital a safer place for the patients
Staff members use event reporting to “tattle” on each other.
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Appendix C
AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture
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Appendix D
Just Culture Assessment Tool
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Appendix E
Revised just culture survey items based on exploratory factor analysis
Feedback and Communication
- The management does a good job of sharing information about events (v1)
- We don’t know about events that happen in our unit (v2)
- I often hear about event conclusions and outcomes (v3)
Openness of Communication
- Staff feel uncomfortable discussing events with supervisors (v4)
- Supervisors respect suggestions from staff members (v5)
- Staff can easily approach supervisors with ideas and concerns (v6)
- If I had a good idea for making an improvement, I believe my suggestion would be
carefully evaluated and taken seriously. (v7)
- I trust supervisors to do the right thing** (v27)
Balance
- Staff members are usually blamed when involved in an event (v8)
- Staff members fear disciplinary action when involved in an event (v9)
- When an event occurs, the follow up team looks at each step in the process to determine
how the event happened. (v10)
- I feel comfortable entering reports about events in which I was involved. (v11)
- Staff members use event reporting to “tattle” on each other. ** (v17)
Quality of error reporting process
- Coworkers discourage each other from reporting events (v12)
- The event reporting system is easy to use (v13)
- Reports are being evaluated and reviewed after they’re entered (v14)
- I’m given time to enter event reports during work hours (v15)
- My supervisors encourage me to report (v16)
Continuous Improvement
- There are improvements because of event reporting (v18)
- The hospital devotes (time/energy/resources) toward making patient safety improvements
(v19)
- By entering reports, I’m making the hospital a safer place for the patients (v20)
- The hospital sees events as opportunities for improvement (v21)
Trust
- The hospital uses a fair and balanced system when evaluating staff involvement in events
(v22)
- I trust that the hospital will handle events fairly (v23)
- The hospital adheres to its own rules and policies (v24)
- I feel comfortable entering report where others were involved. (v25)
- I am uncomfortable with others entering reports about events in which I was involved. (v26)
** Indicates item was reassigned from a different dimension
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